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Care, policy, knowledge: translating between worlds 
 
 
abstract 
 
It is the achievement of this collection to challenge our everyday distinction between care and 
policy.  In these ethnographic accounts, we learn how something we might call 'care-policy' is 
achieved in practice, 'on the ground'.  In this brief postscript, I want to draw attention to the 
corollary world of the office, the way care-policy is constructed in the committee room and the 
debating chamber, in the offices and corridors of its administration.  I note how the work of the 
office is likewise constituted in practice, in interaction between people and between people and 
things. 
 
I then suggest that care-policy in the field and in the office is predicated on different ways of 
knowing; I note a specific tension between case and category.  The studies presented here are made 
at the point of intersection of discrepant worlds/knowledges: some seem to expose and emphasise 
those discrepancies, but others point to ways in which, in practice, they might be resolved.  In 
carrying out inspections, in assembling and articulating generic experiences of injustice, some actors 
seem to do care and policy together, piecing together knowledges of different kinds, translating 
between worlds. 
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introduction 
 
We care for ourselves and for each other, for our parents and children, our communities, the 
environment.  It is difficult to imagine human being without human caring.  In the world in 
which we live, caring appears threatened, seems to be something we must nurture and protect.  
The social space in which it happens - whether of family or community, tradition or culture - 
seems ever diminished, challenged by what appears to be an equal and opposite impulse to 
'policy', that is to governance, regulation and accounting.  This much is addressed by a strain of 
classical sociology, carried by the work of Husserl and Elias, Habermas and Bourdieu: care 
belongs to the realm of culture, lifeworld and habitus, and is challenged or colonised by an 
encroaching system, of rationality, commodity and instrumentality.  So we must take care, it 
seems, of care itself. 
 
But we might also be critical of care: care is a burden, a set of obligations distributed unevenly 
among men and women and according to the prejudices of race and class, a source of 
exploitation and a means of control.  To care for is also to exert power over, for good or ill. 
 
And this is at least in part why care needs policy.  If care is a good thing, if we want to be sure of 
it when and where it's needed and not just as it might happen to be available, if we want to 
mitigate the risk of abuse with which it is associated, then it will require some policy framework 
or complement, whether formal or informal.  Similarly, if policy is to serve any good and useful 
purpose, if it is to be realised effectively, it will be made and implemented carefully and caringly, 
painstakingly, with attention to detail and sensitive to relationships and circumstances. 
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It is the achievement of this collection to challenge our everyday distinction between care and 
policy.  The challenge is made in the course of engaged and nuanced ethnographic accounts, 
introducing us to worlds and practices thickly described and then cleverly and creatively 
theorised.  These are studies of the moment in which the abstract plans and designs of the 
policy maker work directly on their specific and often recalcitrant objects: that which the policy 
sciences conventionally construe as policy implementation as distinct from its formulation.  
Here, in these case studies, care and policy are enacted together, in sometimes complementary, 
sometimes contradictory but invariably uncertain ways.  They are but different aspects of a 
single assemblage, something the actor-network theorist might call 'care-policy'. 
 
Now I want to draw a different distinction, inevitably less well explored in this collection, but 
one to which I think it usefully leads.  It is that between care-policy on the ground, 'in the wild' 
as STS might have it, and care-policy in the committee room and the debating chamber, in the 
offices and corridors of its administration.  For a reciprocal kind of relationship between care 
and policy lurks somewhere above and behind the food inspector (Lavau and Bingham), the 
waste manager (Gill), the care worker (Schillmeier), the community organiser (Tironi and 
Rodriguez-Giralt), the medical or clinical practitioner (Greco; Singleton and Mee), the activist-
researcher (Gabrys) and the conservation biologist (Joks and Law) .  Each comes already 
equipped - burdened - with the form and the questionnaire, the bureaucratic regulation and the 
scientific survey.  But neither she nor he, nor indeed we, can take the form and the 
questionnaire for granted as finished and stable; both remain ontologically and 
epistemologically unfinished and incomplete. 
 
What has already happened?  How have the terms and conditions of care-policy on the ground 
been set?  In what follows, I want to draw attention to what goes on the world of policy making, 
the world in which guidelines and frameworks are both required and produced.  This is to make 
a provisional distinction between the world (and work) of the office, and the world and work of 
the field.  For if we are to understand the relationship between care and policy - let alone if we 
are to improve it - we will need to devote as much of our ethnographic and critical attention to 
the one as to the other.  In our everyday understandings, policy and care are neither essentially 
nor necessarily separate but have been made so; our sociological task, which is perhaps also our 
political task - is to investigate ways in which they might be made and unmade together.   
 
 
1. care and policy in practice 
 
Much that is said here about care and policy 'on the ground' is consistent with the practice turn 
in social science more generally.  Care is realised in practice: it exists only in the doing of it.  In 
the tradition of microsociology, it is a form of action, and specifically of interaction: it is a 
collective accomplishment or achievement carried on in relation with others, both those we 
care with and those we care for, whether in nursing homes in Germany (Schillmeier), in 
meetings of former smelting workers in Chile (Tironi and Rodriguez-Giralt), on a street in 
England (Gill) or in Pennsylvania countryside (Gabrys). 
 
Care entails emotional commitment, and is also physical and material, effected by human 
bodies in collaboration with tools, instruments and machines.  It has a communicative or 
symbolic function, significant and meaningful only to the extent that it is intelligible to others.  It 
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is, by the same token, an articulation of values, normative, a pursuit of certain kinds of good and 
a corollary, inevitable neglect of others.  It is future-oriented: it has the sense of nurture, of 
growing and cultivating that which might be brought into being.  It has a tragic aspect, too: 
caring is sometimes a Sisyphean project to keep sound and whole that which is irreparably 
subject to disintegration and decay.  Care happens in the interstices, in 'moments of hesitation, 
questionability and indecision' (Schillmeier): as a practice, it is an irreducible unit of social life, 
existing and persisting when other kinds of usually more formal and explicit institutional and 
organizational arrangement break down.  
 
Though we learn much less about it here, making and implementing policy - formulating, 
negotiating and enacting collective decisions about collective goods - is also a form of practice, a 
process not an object, a set of relations not a set of things.  For policy is made in myriad 
interactions of human beings, including politicians, civil servants, lawyers, scientific experts, 
lobbyists, activists and others.  It is situated in the way that caring is, though its sites are 
elsewhere, in offices and meeting rooms, on desks and screens.  It is a communicative practice, 
carried out largely through discussion and debate among specialists.  It invariably takes material 
form, principally on paper, in proposals, statements, reports, budgets and bills.  Policy making is 
a process of bringing things into relation with one another, or forming new relations between 
things, including interests, values, precedents, resources and opportunities.  It is a way of 
repairing relations at moments of breakdown: disruptions and disjunctures occasion policy in 
the same way they call for care.  Policy is uncertain and contingent, and about promoting, 
halting and reversing change.  Policy is itself a kind of caring, and those who make policy care 
deeply about what they do. 
 
All of this is only to argue that policy is a practice in the same way that care is; that it is a 
collective accomplishment which endures only in its continuing reiteration.  To say that it is a 
practice is to say equally forcefully that it is not an object or thing; properly, we should speak 
not of care but of caring or providing care, not of policy but of doing or making policy. 
 
In turn, this is to make care-policy in the office and in the field theoretically commensurable, 
only – as we have seen in these papers - to stumble over their frequent incompatibility in 
practice.  What is at issue here, what is made vivid in these papers, is the radical difference 
between these worlds: the practices of care-policy in the office and in the field seem to fit with 
each other only imperfectly, if at all. 
 
Why should this be so?  I think it's because they comprise different ways of knowing.  As 
practices, they are not only relational, communicative, material and normative but also 
knowledgeable: they both rest on and reproduce distinctive epistemologies. 
 
 
2. knowledge practices 
 
'Care-policy' as reconfigured in these papers, and whether in the field or in the office, is nothing 
so much as a way of knowing.  In different worlds, it entails different 'practices of attention' - as 
Stephanie Lavau and Nick Bingham describe the work of care, though their phrase surely applies 
to policy, too.  In each world, it is constituted in categories and constructs which entail different 
ways of knowing and thinking, and which reproduce those worlds.  In this way, they 'bring 
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worlds with them' (Puig de la Bellacasa 2012; Gill), and by the same token they render others 
invisible and inaccessible. 
 
The point is made starkly in Monica Greco's treatment of the problem of medically unexplained 
symptoms.  The effective management of such conditions foregrounds the importance of 
process not merely in procedural terms, as what occurs between pre-constituted subjects or 
entities, but in the conception of the nature of the disease phenomenon as explicitly unfinished, 
in the process of becoming, as well as being itself and vital and responsive.  Approaching 
medically unexplained symptoms in this way differs profoundly from the epistemological 
structure of biomedicine, where diagnostic acts are separated from therapeutic acts.  Caring for 
something as new and as different as this turns on knowing it differently. 
 
This difference is sometimes cast as that between narrative and number.  Solveig Joks and John 
Law contrast Sami 'ways of knowing' about salmon with those of conservation biology.  
Crucially, these different systems are strongly bounded: different ways of knowing cannot know 
anything beyond themselves; they cannot know of or acknowledge each other.  'The stories that 
make up [local ecological knowledge] do not count (literally count) as evidence in the world of 
quantitative population modelling used in conservation biology' (Joks and Law).  In the same 
way, it is perhaps no coincidence that the sociology presented here, which repeatedly asserts 
the significance of care, is built on ethnographic case studies, or stories (Singleton and Mee): 
stories of carrying out food hygiene inspections, of living with stroke or with Alzheimer's, of 
surveying a street. 
 
The difference is also expressed in the case/category problem: care-policy in the field is 
contingent and specific, while in the office it is abstract and generic.  In the field it is specific and 
unique to the local configuration of disposition and circumstance, such that 'conflict between 
caring for emerging situations and caring for comparable settings is inevitable' (Schillmeier).  
Care-policy in the field is addressed to the case with which it is immediately confronted; in the 
office, it is to the category or set in which the case must be placed. 
 
Another way of exploring these differences in epistemological terms is to think of the one, care-
policy in the field, as resting principally on embodiment in a knowing subject, and the other, in 
the office, on inscription in artefacts, and especially in documents. In the field, care-policy is 
produced in embodied action and interaction, in the immediate experience of seeing and feeling 
and doing.  This is how we know how to care and what to care about: how we learn of the need 
for it, how we learn what is needed and how to provide it.  It is produced in the office, by 
contrast, in the interaction of mediated accounts and representations of the world, in debating 
and discussing statements, proposals, budgets and other forms of documentary evidence.  
'Scientific knowledge, statistically informed... (is) decanted into administrative regulations' as 
Joks and Law put it, while local ecological knowledge is 'not intrinsically textual in form'. 
 
Care-policy is then re-inscribed in the administrative template or form, which serves as its 
material technology of attention: the form translates and condenses official requirements into 
specific observations, shaping where and how, for example, the food inspector Jack should 
direct his attention (Lavau and Bingham). It is the form that 'make(s) equivalence possible' (Gill). 
 
This explains much of the seeming horror of care-policy as produced in the office, its appearance 
as other and alien.  The immediacy and idiosyncrasy of the field must be faded out, its 
 5 
interactional quality reduced in order to be represented in generic terms and made comparable 
with others - and it's that reduction that we cannot bear.  The office tends to make care or 
compassion knowable as a measurable good held by individuals (Singleton and Mee), and that 
seems to deprive it (and us) of its essentially human, social character. 
 
Practices clash, then, because epistemologies do.  And yet, while there is much in these papers 
to show that 'embodied' care and 'inscribed' policy are incompatible, there is just as much to 
suggest that they might be and sometimes are indeed brought into relation in practice.  For 
whether embodied or inscribed, knowledge must be enacted, realised through being articulated 
in action (Freeman and Sturdy 2014).  What is interesting is how many of those actions create 
hybrids, appear to translate between worlds (Freeman 2009). 
 
The practitioner is an epistemological bricoleur (Freeman 2007).  In performing a food safety 
check in a small poultry butchery, Stephanie Lavau and Nick Bingham show, Maria 'patch(es) 
together a composite picture from the variety of knowledges she has generated', including her 
recall of previous visits and what she sees now, the weight and feel of a carcass, the paperwork 
which documents the origin of the meat and the identity and qualifications of staff who process 
it, the evidence presented by the physical environment of a building, its fittings and work 
surfaces - and makes sense of all of this in relation to what she knows of regulations and 
standards.  In practice, in caring and in doing policy - in implementing policy carefully - different 
ways of knowing are knitted together. 
 
In a different way, information is inscribed in the bodies of former workers at a copper smelting 
plant, in the form of the scars and diseases they carry (Tironi and Rodriguez-Giralt).  Policy, or at 
least a claim to a new and different policy, is articulated in their leader's (Luis's) embodied 
performance in a meeting, which serves to galvanise their collective interest.  Caring of this kind 
makes for knowing, through the assimilation and accumulation of information; shared knowing 
makes for the possibility of collective - that is, political - action.  For these workers, care is 'a way 
of making their circumstances and suffering understandable, knowable and actionable' (Tironi 
and Rodriguez-Giralt).  Is that caring, or doing policy, or perhaps both? 
 
Chuck and Janis care about their Pennsylvania environment, and are concerned at the effects of 
fracking on it, and so begin to monitor changing levels of air pollution near their home (Gabrys). 
They work speculatively rather than experimentally or scientifically, and, with others, contribute 
to the aggregation of what would otherwise remain discrete, distributed feeling and experience.  
'Care emerges here through indicating the harm experienced by individuals, which can further 
begin to inform additional ways of addressing the harm experienced by communities' (Gabrys).  
Chuck and Janis care, not by countering or resisting science and policy, but by doing them 
differently, in combination. 
 
 
3. care, policy and knowledge in practice 
  
The questions posed in and by these papers have to do with the nature of care and caring, the 
relationship between care and policy and the way it is tested, formed and reformed in practice.  
This is an important political question: 'Who cares for what, when, how?', as Harold Lasswell 
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might have put it.1  It is, clearly, a profoundly sociological question, too: what are we doing 
when we are caring?  And answering any of these questions properly entails asking yet another, 
which has to do with the nature of policy and policy making.  If we are interested in the 
relationship between care and policy, we will want to understand not only (i) how care is 
constructed, but also (ii) how policy is constructed, and then (iii) how the difference between 
them is constructed. 
 
The achievement of this collection is to challenge the sense that care intrinsically different to 
policy, or that policy is somehow intrinsically different to care.  We might think of policy itself as 
a form of care, and in that light ask questions of the way it is constructed and carried out.  I have 
tried to suggest that the difference between 'policy' and 'care' is constituted through the 
practices by which they are performed.  We create differences between care and policy in 
practice, just as we create the difference between who cares and who or what is cared for by 
doing that caring, in practice.  Does this also suggest ways in which those differences might be 
overcome?  Might we remake the relation between care and policy? 
 
Doing so will entail undoing any 'settled notion of policy' (Gill).  It will mean treating policy 
making as a practice or set of practices, something which goes on between human beings, which 
can be done well or badly, for good or ill.  It will mean accessing and appraising, recognising and 
rethinking the practice of the policy maker sociologically, making the world of the office present 
in the way the work of the field appears in these papers.  It will mean finding out how care and 
policy are enacted in relation to each other in the office, too, how their different registers 
connect (Clark and Bettini), what happens 'when contexts meet' (Singleton, 2012; Gill). 
 
If the uncertainties of the relationship between care and policy in the field and in the office can 
be attributed at least in part to their respective ways of knowing, then it is in paying specific 
attention to their knowledge practices that we might begin to reform the relationship between 
them.  Just as the office feels for a grip on care in the work of the food inspector and the 
environmental surveyor, so the field reaches for policy in the local activity of those affected by 
copper smelting and the fracking industry.  But they don't quite connect, at least not as well as 
they might, and at least not in the studies gathered here.  What would it take for policy and care 
to find some further connection, some way of talking to each other, some practical 
commensurability? 
 
Natalie Gill describes the operations of the office in her surveyor's coding and highlighting, his 
skillful manipulation of categories and indices, his trained ability to convert the mundane 
appearance of the street into the terms set out on the form.  His work seems to deny the social 
properties of the street, the meaning it has to those who use it, those who live in the 
community of which it is a part.  But it might be otherwise: what if his project and the need for it 
were genuinely negotiated with that community, what if it were designed and carried out in 
collaboration with them? 
 
To bring the office into an immediate and meaningful relationship with the field will entail 
fostering direct encounters between the two.  It will entail new forms of participation and 
engagement, new ways of doing politics as well as care and policy.  We need to find ways to 
allow care-policy in the office and the field to work together and in relation to each other 
                                                          
1 The play is on his classic Politics: Who gets what, when, how, McGraw-Hill, 1936. 
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without trying to reduce them to the same thing.  We need to know what it might really mean 
to 'explore ways of allowing the two sets of practices to go on more even-handedly in 
difference' (Joks and Law). 
 
Lastly, we might ask what kind of sociology is needed to explore, understand and promote this 
varied work of temporary and precarious reconciliations.  For sociology is a practice, too, after 
all, and quintessentially a 'practice of attention'.  It is a 'human science', one that seeks to 
combine the contrary impulses I have tried to explore here.  These papers show that sociology 
cares, in various critical and constructive ways.  But they also show that it is also something like 
policy: it makes and takes representations of the world and brings them into relation with each 
other, in order to say something generic, abstract, even law-like.  It works between the 
specificities and sensitivities of the case and the regimes of science and regulation.  Its 
practitioners write 'speculatively', perhaps both despite and because they know their writings 
will be classed as 'output', accorded a number, made equivalent to others.  And in writing about 
the policies and practices of caring they are themselves 'caring for what exists' in Foucault's 
phrase (Bell 2015).  They are remaking - carefully - what counts as science, what counts as 
policy, and what count as the appropriate objects of their attention. 
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